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The Rise and the Fall of the Thai Young Turks
Thak CHALOEMTIARANA*
A Review of Chai-Anan Samudavanija's
The Thai Young Turks**
The Thai Young Tu rks is the work of a
prominent young Thai political scientist.
Chai-Anan Samudavanija is the first of
his generation to achieve the rank of
professor at a major Thai university. Like
many of his colleagues, he has recently
increased his efforts to publish m the
English language. His research on the
role of middle ranking officers of the
Royal Thai Army is indeed an important
and welcome addition to the literature on
modern Thai politics.
Although the military has always been
central to the Thai political system, au-
thoritative works on the subject have not
been readily forthcoming. David Wilson's
article in John ]. Johnson's edited volume
[Johnson 1962J is perhaps the first of its
kind to examine systematically, and criti-
cally, the role of the Thai military. There
is also the often quoted dissertation of Jin
* Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York 14853, U. S. A.
** 1982. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies. 120pp.
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Vibhatakarasa [1966J which unfortunately
was never revised nor published as a text.
The most recent attempts to grapple with
this subject were rather unsatisfactory
[Elliot 1978; Lissak 1976; Welch and
Smith 1974J.1)
Published works on the military written
by Thais have also been rather scarce.
Books of note are Thawat Mokarapong's
study of the 1932 Revolution, Suchin
Tantikun's coverage of the 1947 coup
d'etat,Zl and perhaps my own work on the
Sarit regime. In 1978, there was an attempt
to generate interest in the study of the
military in Thai politics. Young political
scientists and students met at Chulalong-
korn University to listen to and discuss
six papers which were presented over the
1) These works relied on secondary sources
which proved to be their major weakness.
Also, their fascination with neat theoretical
frameworks overshadowed meaningful in-
sights into reality.
2) See Suchin Tantikun, Ratthaprahan Ph. S.
2490 [The 1947 Coup], Bangkok: Social Sci-
ence Association of Thailand, 1972.
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course of several weeks. These meetings
were well attended. The papers were
subsequently published [Journal of Social
Science 1978].
It is worth noting that this series of
lectures was held a year and a half after
the 1976 blood-letting at Thammasat, and
at a time when the so-called young turks
were actively on the prowl. From the
papers, one of which was Chai-Anan's, it
was apparent to all present that few con-
crete facts were known of the Thai mili-
tary. Thai scholars were as much in the
dark as their foreign colleagues. While it
was easy to discuss and debate the hypoth-
eses of Huntington, Janowitz, Finer, and
Nordlinger, it is a different matter to try to
use those conceptual tools to analyze Thai
politics. Too many gaps and questions are
stilI left unanswered.
Chai-Anan presented another paper on
the military at a conference held in New
Delhi in February 1979. Soon after his
return, he was appointed political adviser
to the new prime minister, General Prem
Tinsulanon. As it has now become exceed-
ingly clear, Prem's rise can be attributed
to the lobbying and maneuvering of the
young turks. It is also clear that the NIDA
connection brought together the uneasy
coalition of General Sant Chitpatima, the
young turks, and several members of the
Thai intelligentsia. Chai-Anan was a
member of this group and thus was able
to become acquainted with these officers.
Also, he was able to observe first hand the
in-fighting and political chicaneries that
were endemic at those rarefied levels of
politics.
The book itself is somewhat concise,
although ambitiously divided into six chap-
ters. Chai-Anan provides the reader with
hard-to-find information on the structural
organization of the Thai Army, lists of key
army officers from 1974 to 1981, the names
and commands of the young turks, and a
handy list of Army commanders-in-chief
from 1932 to 1981. The appendices, charts
and figures reflect Chai-Anan's meticulous
scholarship, which is appreciated by this
reader. My only criticism regards his
failure to update and illustrate the changes
and modern implications of the Soi
Rajakru and Sisao Deves cliques first
outlined by Riggs [1966J .3)
Chai-Anan's first two chapters cover
the historical background of Thai politics
and the involvement of the military, in
particular, the army. While these chapters
may appear perfunctory, Chai-Anan does
bring out important cultural variables that
affect Thai political behavior. Concepts
such as barami, thi phung, greng jai, kan
muang, kan borihan, plong toll are covered.
While I am sure that they are not devel-
oped to the satisfaction of many readers,
Chai-Anan's attempt to incorporate these
concepts is a step in the right direction. 4l
In hindsight, the coup of April 1, 1981
appeared rather foolhardy. Given the nature
3) Several years ago, while still associated with
the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in
Singapore, Ho Kwan Ping studied these two
cliques in some detaiL Perhaps Chai-Anan
should have used these studies to up-date
his information.
4) In this respect, Chai-Anan and his colleague
Sombat Chantornwong are the appropriate
authors to propagate what should be studied
as the fundamentals of Thai political phi-
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of Thai politics and the lessons of history,
certain conditions are usually met before
a coup can be successful and lasting. It
has been generally observed that most
coups had a strong leader who had
captured the fancy, or had direct control,
of strategic troops, particularly the First
Division. More importantly perhaps, is the
reliance on the monarchy as legitimizer
of newly acquired power.
Chai-Anan's coverage of the coup and
its aftermath discusses these two requi-
sites openly. In the past, the political role
of the monarchy has been discussed in
sacrosanct and cosmological terms. De facto
influence and involvement were ignored,
in fact, forfeited to the de jure concept of
national palladium--magical, and above
politics. The April 1, 1981 coup in effect
normalized the anomaly between theory
and practice. It deflated the institution
of the monarchy to the level of mundane
secular politics. The throne was no longer
merely a ceremonial legitimizer of power.
It had become a prominent actor in the
schema of political succession.
Despite the young turks' rhetoric of
democratic representation, socio-economic
justice, legal rights, and order, the general
public was sluggish to embrace these
underlying principles as adequate bases
for governance. There had been too many
coups--14 since 1932. Thais have be-
losophy since they had jointly published
Khwamkid thang kanmuang lae sangkhom
thai [Thai Political Philosophy and Society],
Bankok: Banakit Press, 1980. I agree with
them that basic conceptualization is still
very much in need in the study of political
behavior in Thai society.
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come skeptical and cynical about the goals
and aspirations of military coup groups.
Anticipation of the event is exciting. The
prediction of imminent coups is also a
favourite national past-time. But in most
instances, broadcasted coup rationale is
seen as merely ex post facto justification
for its staging and execution.
Interestingly, Chai-Anan reveals that
the young turks controlled 42 key army
battalions and regiments. Most of those
officers were combat veterans who had
fought insurgents and communists. Even
the assessment of the least biased of
observers will concede that the young turks
held preponderant firepower within the
army. Yet they failed in the crunch.
The weak spot in their armor was their
failure to anticipate the actions of members
of the royal family. They underestimated
the antagonism that the royalty had against
General Sant, the coup's titular leader. It
is also clear that middle-ranking officers
did not have direct access to the monar-
chy. The young turk's socialization had
been one of ritualistic obedience to the
throne, and their perception of the monar-
chy was based on the sense of duty and
historical purity, not political pragmatism.
It is ironic that the young turks did
not openly criticize members of the royalty
for politicizing the monarchy. Instead,
they admonished and protested Generals
Prem and Athit's monopoly of loyalty to
the throne. Their decision not to resist
the Prem countercoup was predicated
upon the realization that if they had won
the battIe, they would ipso facto destroy
the prestige and thus the sanctity of the
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throne. Their actions confirmed the dictum
that political power in Thailand remains
with those who have the backing of the
army and king.
Finally, the incident inaugurated a new
phase of Thai politics. It openly legiti-
mized the political role of the throne and
members of the royal family. It hinted at
the possibility of a prismatic segmentation
of various political groups backed by
factions within the army and factions
within the royal family and its entourage.
As the Chalard coup of 1976 highlighted
the importance of controlling the major
broadcasting networks, the young turks'
coup brought up lessons that one invariably
learns in the game of chess-- the king
is important, but in many gambits, it is
the queen that must receive particular
attention.
Theoretically, middle level officers are
important to a coup d'etat. However, they
are seldom central actors. 5l The young
turks' episode confirms this. It is never-
theless important that we should study
and learn more about them as a pressure
group.
Chai-Anan noted that there were sev-
eral factors common to the leadership of
the group. The seven leaders were in the
same cadet class at the Thai Military
5) Chai-Anan contends that there have been
few studies on the middle-ranking officers.
This is substantiated by a review of what
has appeared in the journal Armed Forces
and Society, 1974-present. Of course, excep-
tions are studies of young armies emerging
from a colonial past. One of the best is
Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1971.
Academy. This provided the initial link
and basis for group cohesion. Further-
more, they were head cadets and leaders
since Academy days. They came from
middle-class backgrounds. They were all
from the Central region. They attended
the Army Staff College. They all served in
Vietnam. Colonel Chamlong and Colonel
Manoon, the two primi inter pares, had
advanced education in the United States.
It was also noted that 11 members of this
class--Class 7--were senators. Several
held influential positions in the Prem gov-
ernment.
While the author has succeeded in tanta-
lizing us with the preceding information,
he does not develop these leads much
further. For example, we get glimpses of
the significance of the common Vietnam
experience, the shared middle-class begin-
nings, but yet we seem to fail to understand
fully how these contributed to their col-
lective philosophy and vision.
One would hope to find that the
American experience for Chamlong had
a more lasting effect than the pai ihiew/
joyride. Also, the significance of the
Vietnam experience seems pregnant with
information which may explain the group's
emotional and political character. Perhaps
this reviewer is asking for something that
is not there, and in fact, the young turks
are merely officers with good intentions,
but have yet to fully develop their politi-
cal acumen.
The latter may be closer to the truth.
Chapter 5 entitled "In Search of a Better
Society" is rather revealing. Although
they insisted that they were professional
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soldiers, in fact the young turks were not
different in kind from their seniors whom
they despised. It is impossible to defend
the army's corporate interests, which was
the group's goal, in the milieu of politics
of scarce resources without dirtying their
hands. The allocation of society's values
and resources are determined through
authoritative political action. For example,
the counterexhibition of captured com-
munist weapons, while students at Tham-
masat were immersed in Red China week, is
by nature political. It also seems unrealistic
for a professional soldier to sit in parlia-
ment and not be involved in politics.
Not only were they confused about
their own professionalism, their expressed
ideology was rather sterile. Perhaps Chai-
Anan had given too much credit to the
formulation of the young turks' ideology.
Major Sanchai's slim volume on Why do
Soldiers Stage Coups? [Thahan Dek 1978]
in essence summarized the theories of
Janowitz and Huntington. In fact, infatua-
tion with the Huntingtonian reformist zeal
is not new.
What came out of it was essentially a
bid for conservative revolution. Analytically,
it can even be depicted as neo-Marxist, as
the group's plan for national salvation
stipulates that initial attention should be
focussed upon socia-economic reforms. The
group believes that political equality will
be stable as it will be based on a devel-
oped and correct economic and social sub-
structure.
As long as the young turks acted as a
pressure group within the army they were
able to bide their time as king-makers.
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However, I seriously doubt whether they
were equipped, or had the foresight, to
govern and spearhead reform and develop-
ment. A conservative revolution seems
destined to fail from the start as the thrust
of the group's ideology contained internal
weaknesses and contradictions. They failed
to understand that it is impossible (except
conceptually) to compartmentalize the
social, the economic, and the political,
to change one and keep the others on
hold. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether
the nature of capitalism and free enterprise
was fully understood by the young turks.5 )
On final balance, however, Chai-Anan's
efforts should be roundly applauded. It took
courage and foresight on his part to
prepare this volume. Chai-Anan has indeed
raised relevant and important issues, issues
that are now perhaps easier to tackle as the
young turks had inadvertantly let the royal
cat out of the bag.
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